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A hospital's network is degraded to unusable within 15 minutes of a visitor plugging in a laptop. By the time IT reacts, patient monitoring systems are offline. Root cause: the visitor ran a tool that sent hundreds of thousands of bogus MAC addresses, overflowing every switch's MAC table. Once full, switches flooded all traffic to all ports — a perfect sniffing environment and a DoS in one.
That attack has a name — MAC flooding — and a defense — port security. The pattern repeats across every Layer 2 attack: specific technique, specific impact, specific mitigation. This lesson covers the attacks you'll actually encounter defending enterprise networks.
| Attack | What it does | Defense |
|---|---|---|
| MAC flooding | Overflows MAC table → switch floods all frames | Port security, MAC limits |
| MAC spoofing | Impersonates another host's MAC | Port security with sticky MACs, DHCP snooping |
| VLAN hopping | Sends frames to reach other VLANs | Disable DTP, change native VLAN, set mode access |
| ARP spoofing | Poisons ARP cache → man-in-the-middle | Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI), DHCP snooping |
| DHCP starvation | Exhausts DHCP pool → DoS | DHCP snooping, port security |
| Rogue DHCP server | Hands out wrong gateway/DNS | DHCP snooping trust configuration |
| STP attack | Takes over as root bridge | BPDU Guard, Root Guard |
| Double tagging | VLAN hopping via native VLAN | Change native VLAN to unused ID |
The MAC table has a fixed size — typically 8K to 32K entries depending on the switch model. Flooding it with bogus entries takes seconds. Once full, the switch falls back to flooding — it can't learn new entries, so every frame goes everywhere. The attacker now sees all traffic, and legitimate hosts see degraded performance.
Port security defends against MAC flooding by limiting the number of MAC addresses learned on a port. A user port should have 1-3 MACs (PC, phone, maybe a printer). If an attacker tries to send 10,000 source MACs, the port err-disables after the third. Configure port security on all access ports.
The amplification attacks deserve special note. The attacker sends a small query with a spoofed source IP (the victim's IP) to an open public service that replies with a much larger response. The victim receives huge traffic from the reflector — not from the attacker. Mitigation includes BCP38 (source address validation at ISPs), blocking open resolvers, and disabling unused services.
The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain gives this flow its name. Every stage is a chance for defenders to detect or block. The earlier you catch the attacker, the cheaper the remediation. That's why segmentation, monitoring, and least-privilege matter — they slow the chain at every step.
Finish the lesson once you have worked through the material. This awards ★ 30 XP.